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I. INTRODUCTION
With new federal legislation1 and the evolution of federal Indian
policy, 2 Indian tribes began to move from beneath the shadow of termina-
tion toward self-determination in the early 1970's. Perhaps no area of
tribal activity progressed as much since the advent of self-determination as
tribal control over Indian lands, including Indian mineral resources. In
recent years, significant legislative enactments,3 administrative develop-
ments,4 and United States Supreme Court decisions5 have yielded to self-
* The author is presently a law clerk for the Honorable Merlyn H. Hoyt, 7th Judicial District
Court, Nevada and received a J.D. from the University of Montana in 1987.
This paper was pieced together with the assistance of a research grant from the Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Foundation.
I. See, e.g., Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284,82 Stat. 73,78-80 (1968 Amendments to
Public Law 280); Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77.
2. President's Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 894 (July
8, 1970).
3. E.g., Indian Self-determination and Educational Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat.
2203 (1975); 1982 Indian Mineral Development Act, Pub. L. No. 97-382,96 Stat. 1938 (codified at 25
U.S.C. §§ 2101 - 2108 (1982)); Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act (FOGRMA), Pub. L.
No. 97-451, 96 Stat. 2447 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701 - 1757 (1982))
4. Such developments include the establishment of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Trust
Responsibility, Energy Minerals Division and the planned improvements in reporting under
FOGRMA.
5. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Kerr McGee Corp. v.
Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195 (1985); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
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determination in the management of tribal resources.
The federal Indian mineral development program in existence at the
advent of self-determination was often criticized. One of the more
complete reports critical of the program was published by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) in October, 1975.6 The FTC recognized that
while some tribes did not permit mineral development on their lands,
dependence upon mineral resources as the chief source of tribal income was
typical of the mineral producing tribes." The FTC criticized regulations
and statutes that did not permit negotiated oil and gas leasing.? Further,
the lack of geologic and production information created a vacuum which
drained productivity from the Indian mineral development program.' 0
The FTC report did note that the standard lease terms employed in
the program "were compatible with maximum economic recovery."' , The
report stressed, however, the need for simplified leasing procedures, 2
increased centralization of lease and lease-sale information,'3 and pre-sale
exploration by tribes of their mineral resources.' 4 Another federal report,
published in 1976, generally concurred with the findings of the FTC
report.' 5 The 1976 report then divided the need for improvement into two
large categories. First, the report called for changes that would enhance
the tribal bargaining position when planning for mineral resource develop-
ment.' 6 Second, the 1976 report espoused the use of non-lease development
agreements and increased flexibility for tribes to negotiate mineral
development agreements.Y
This article reviews the origin and growth of the Indian mineral
leasing program. A principal part of this article will review legislative
changes and recent Court decisions which could affect the Indian mineral
development program. Administrative changes which may lead to the
availability of mineral information and the use of non-lease production
6. Federal Trade Comm'n., Bureau of Competition, Staff Report on Mineral Leasing on Indian
Lands (1975).
7. Id. at 38-9. Tribes that did not allow mineral leasing at the time included the Santo Domingo,
San Felipe, and Taos tribes.
8. Id. at 10.
9. Id. at 77.
10. Id at 93-6.
11. Id. at 97.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 101.
14. Id. at 98.
15. TROSPER, AMERICAN INDIAN MINERAL AGREEMENTS: LITERATURE SEARCH AND REFORM
PROPOSALS, reprinted in TASK FORCE SEVEN: PRESERVATION AND RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT AND
PROTECTION, FINAL REPORT TO THE AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N., at 137-47 (July
29, 1976).
16. Id. at 141-44.
17. id.
[Vol. 9
1988] INDIAN MINERAL PRODUCTION
agreements is also discussed.
In no manner does this article pretend to be a complete review of issues
within the Indian mineral development program. For example, this article
does not discuss environmental protection issues,' 8 the problems presented
by the fractionated ownership of Indian allotments,"9 or issues in tribal civil
jurisdiction affecting mineral production. This article's objective is to
provide an understanding of Indian mineral development as the program
arrives at tribal self-determination.
II. INDIAN MINERAL LEASING BEFORE SELF-DETERMINATION
Beginning in the late 19th century, federal policy sought an ordered
assimilation of Indian tribes into an agrarian lifestyle. The General
Allotment Act of 1887 became the main vehicle for this federal policy.'
Supported by both proponents and opponents of assimilation, the Act
allotted each individual Indian a portion of reservation lands to be used for
agricultural purposes and opened the remaining lands to settlement.22
Amendments to that act, adopted in 1891, attempted to accommodate the
increased demand for access to Indian lands.2' The 1891 Act provided the
initial statutory authorization for mineral leasing Indian lands. 4
The federal Indian mineral leasing program matured in a haphazard
fashion in the forty years following the adoption of the 1891 Act. Some
legislation affecting Indian mineral leasing affected only specific tribes and
reservations. 5 Other legislation affected only certain classes of Indian
lands. 6 And still other enactments affected all Indian mineral leasing in a
18. See Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (9th Cir. 1972).
19. Indian allotments have fractionated through inheritance to the point that ownership
interests in allotments have become confused. This confusion has, on occasion, had a negative effect on
the mineral development of certain allotments.
20. For example, tribal civil jurisdiction allows, to an extent, tribal zoning, health and safety
regulations. How the exercise of such jurisdiction may affect mineral operations is avoided in this
paper.
21. General Allotment Act of 1887, ch. 1919,24 Stat. 388, (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
331-334, 339, 341, 354, 381 (1982)). This act provided the general framework for assimilation. Over
the years allotment acts affecting individual reservations were enacted to govern the allotment process
locally. The rights retained by landowners, tribes and settlers often depended on these acts. See, e.g.,
Act of March 1, 1901, ch. 675, 31 Stat. 848 (An act for allotment of lands of the Cherokee Tribe) and
Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 224, 41 Stat. 741 (An act for the allotment of lands of the Crow Tribe).
22. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1982).
23. Act of February 28, 1891, ch. 383, 26 Stat. 795 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 397
(1982)).
24. 25 U.S.C. § 397.
25. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1927, ch. 299, 44 Stat. 1249 (addressing mineral development on
the Osage reservation).
26. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1927, ch. 299, 44 Stat. 1347 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 398(a)
(1982)) (providing for the leasing of unalloted Indian lands within executive order reservations).
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general manner.17 During those forty years, Congress enacted four statutes
which had a lasting impact on Indian mineral leasing.
The 1891 Act authorized Indian land leases for mining purposes, but
applied only to Indian lands that were "bought and paid for," and either
unallotted or allotted and not put to beneficial use.2 8 Statutory authoriza-
tion to lease allotted lands for the benefit of Indian allottees was established
in 1909.129 The 1909 Act is significant because it did not restrict the lease
authority of the Secretary of the Interior to a term of years.30 Instead, the
Act permitted leases "for any term of years as may be deemed
advisable ... ."31
The next major legislation affecting mining on Indian lands was
enacted in 1919. In that year, Congress authorized mining for metallifer-
ous minerals on Indian lands. 2 The 1919 was significant to the overall
growth of the Indian mineral leasing program for several reasons. First the
1919 Act applied to all Indian reservations in the nine western states. 3
Second, the 1919 Act preserved the states' right to tax assets of mineral
lessees.34 Third, the 1919 Act was the first to guarantee a tribe income from
each mining claim. 5 Although the Act did not authorize the state taxation
of Indian mineral income, it paved the way for that authorization a few
years later.
In 1924, Congress enacted legislation directed toward oil and gas
leasing on Indian lands.3 6 Several provisions of the 1924 Act would be
carried forward when the Indian mineral leasing program was overhauled
in 1938. The 1924 Act first required that oil and gas leasing of Indian lands
occurred through public auction, which was an apparent effort to maxi-
mize lease rental income.3 7 The Act provided indefinite lease terms to both
existing leases and to those leases given effect under the act.38 Finally, the
1924 Act provided for state taxation of mineral production, requiring the
27. See, e.g., Act of June 17, 1919, ch. 4, § 26,41 Stat. 31-34 (providing generally for the leasing
of unalloted Indian lands for the mining of metals).
28. 25 U.S.C. § 391.
29. Act of March 3, 1909, ch. 263, 35 Stat. 783 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 396 (1982))
30. In an earlier act, the Secretary also had authority to lease unalloted lands without restriction
to a term of years but that act only applied to the Osage reservation. See Act of June 28, 1906, ch. 357,
34 Stat. 539.
31. 25 U.S.C. § 396.
32. Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 4, § 26, 41 Stat. 3, 31-34, (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 399 (1982))
33. 25 U.S.C. § 399. The nine western states were California, Idaho, Oregon, Arizona, Nevada,
Washington, Montana, Wyoming and New Mexico. Previous legislation had either been directed
toward a specific class of Indian land or to certain reservations.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Act of May 29, 1924, ch. 210, 43 Stat. 244 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1982)).
37. 25 U.S.C. § 398.
38. Id.
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Secretary to assess state taxes against Indian royalty income. 9
In 1927, Congress enacted its last major piece of legislation affecting
the Indian mineral leasing program during the era of assimilation.40 The
1927 Act permitted leasing on those reservations created by executed order
under terms and conditions similar to those present in the 1924 Act.41
Unlike the earlier act, however, the 1927 Act limited state taxation to oil
and gas leases.42
The publication of the Merriam Report in 1928 represented the first
major criticism of federal Indian policy from within the government.43
While the report disclosed the failures of federal Indian policies, it did not
directly address problems within the Indian mineral leasing program.
44
Thus, when Congress enacted the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) in
1934,," that program's problems were not given adequate attention. The
IRA extended indefinitely the existing trust responsibility and continued
restriction against the alienation of Indian lands;46 it restored all unused
lands within reservation boundaries to tribal ownership; 47 and, it allowed
tribes that reorganized under the act significant autonomy in the use of
their lands.4 Generally, the IRA attempted to revitalize the tribal
sovereignty over Indian lands that had diminished during the assimilation
era.
Difficulties existing in the Indian mineral leasing program continued.
Principle among these problems was the strict federal supervision of the
program,49 the differential treatment of Indian lands according to varying
classification,50 and the state taxation of certain mineral production.51
Further, some of the rights granted to reorganized tribes conflicted with
law that controlled the program.52 The tension between the mineral laws
39. Id.
40. Act of March 3, 1927, ch. 299,44 Stat. 1347 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a-398e (1982)).
41. 25 U.S.C. § 398a.
42. Id. § 398c. This act also fixed the exterior boundaries of executive order reservations unless
Congress acted otherwise. See 25 U.S.C. § 398d.
43. MERRIAM, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION (1928) (reprinted in 1971 by the
Johnson Reprint Corp.).
44. Id.
45. Indian Reorganization Act, ch. 576,48 Stat. 984 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461 - 479
(1982)).
46. 25 U.S.C. § 462.
47. Id. § 463.
48. Id. § 476.
49. The Secretary's consent to lease has always been required. Several acts even permitted the
Secretary to enter leases without tribal approval. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 396 and 399.
50. These legal classifications included not only allotted and unallotted classes, but executive
order and treaty reservations, restricted lands and lands which were "bought and paid for."
51. For example, under the 1927 Act, states could tax only oil and gas leases but not other
mineral production.
52. See HOUSE COMM. ON INDIAN AFFAIRS, LEASING INDIAN LANDS FOR MINING PURPOSES, H.
1988]
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and the objectives of the IRA-along with the inconsistencies in mineral
laws-lead to omnibus legislation that restructured the entire Indian
mineral leasing program.
With the blessing of the Department of the Interior," Congress
enacted the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 (1938 Act)."" The act had
three primary purposes: to obtain uniformity in Indian mineral leasing
laws, to bring the Indians the greatest return for their property, and to
bring all leasing matters into harmony with the IRA.55 The 1938 Act
granted tribes leasing authority;5 adopted indefinite lease term provi-
sions;57 required corporate lessees to post security bonds before beginning
lease operations;58 continued the requirement for competitive oil and gas
leasing;59 and, repealed all inconsistent acts or parts of acts.6" The act did
not apply retroactively leaving existing leases unchanged and in-
place-but it did control all Indian mineral leasing thereafter.61 The 1938
Act also required the promulgation of rules and regulations under which
the program would operate.6 Collectively, the 1938 Act and the subse-
quent regulations fixed a rigid framework for mineral leasing protecting
the Indian mineral interest and benefiting the Indian lessor.6"
III. PROGRAM ADVANCES SPAWNED BY SELF-DETERMINATION
A. The Self-determination Policy
When Congress adopted self-determination as a goal for Indian
tribes, it made several findings and declarations important to the growth of
Indian controlled mineral development. Congress recognized that feder-
ally dominated Indian services programs actually retarded the social
R. REP. No. 1872, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 1 (1938). The Tribal right to lease their lands and to reject
mineral leases proposed by the Secretary is not found in mineral leasing acts prior to the 1938 Act.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, 52 Stat. 347 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 396a -
396f (1982)).
55. H. R. REp. No. 1872,75th Cong., 3d Sess. 1 (1938). See also Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe,
471 U.S. 759 (1985).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 396a.
57. Id.
58. Id. § 396c.
59. Id. § 396b.
60. Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, ch. 198, § 7, 52 Stat. 347, 348.
61. 84 I.D. 905, 908 (1977) ("[T]he clear intent of the 1938 Act was to replace earlier leasing
statutes ... ." (emphasis in original)).
62. 25 U.S.C. § 396d.
63. Interestingly, the regulations governing leasing of Indian lands have been more beneficial to
the Indian lessor than regulations controlling mineral leasing on federal lands. For example, the rents
for Indian mineral leases have generally been higher than rents on other federal leases. Compare 25
C.F.R. § 171.12(b) with 43 C.F.R. §§ 3101.2 - 3101.7.
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progress of Indian tribes.6 4 Congress found that the advancement of self-
determination lie balanced on educational opportunity.65 And the maxi-
mum participation of Indians in tribal assistance programs became a
declared goal."" Congress recognized, however, that the achievement of
that goal would require careful planning and cooperation.
67
Title I of the Self-determination Act did not create new law; it
consolidated and codified existing authority to contract with Indian
tribes.6 8 In general terms, Title I established an affirmative duty of the
Secretary to review and enter into contracts with tribes to provide services
traditionally controlled by the agency. 9 Title I also authorized contracts
with tribal organizations for specific purposes1 0 and it allowed that such
contracts be negotiated rather than let out to bid. 7 ' Thus, while the act
propagated an increased interest in tribal self-determination, it also
sparked an interest in alternative methods of contracting for mineral
production. The interest in tribal self-determination in itself sparked a
need for greater mineral revenue. 2
While almost every aspect of the mineral leasing program under the
1938 Act allowed agency discretion or required the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior, 3 this scheme of strict federal control was not
unusual. Federal law had long restricted the transfer of Indian lands74 and
required approval of contracts between Indians and non-Indians.1 5 Tribes
that reorganized under the IRA had the opportunity to control some
mineral leasing, 6 but even that opportunity had limited potential.77 Not
until the policies of self-determination were exposed by the executive
64. Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, P.L. No. 93-638, § 2, 88 Stat.
2203 (1975) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 450 (1982)).
65. 25 U.S.C. § 450a.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Isreal, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. FOUND. INST. ON
INDIAN LAND DEVELOPMENT IN OIL, GAS, COAL AND OTHER MINERALS, 10-15 (1976).
69. Indian Self-Determination Act, Title I, § 102, 88 Stat. 2203, 2206 (1975).
70. Id. at § 104, 88 Stat. at 2207.
71. Id. at § 106, 88 Stat. at 2210.
72. The increased participation in federal programs would not only reduce the federal
domination of these programs but also reduce the federal appropriations for them. The tribes, on the
other hand, would be required to take up the slack. Some tribes were already largely dependent upon
mineral income to fund their social programs. In 1974, for example, over three-quarters of the Navajo
budget was provided by its mineral revenues. See Federal Trade Comm'n., Bureau of Competition,
Staff Report on Mineral Leasing on Indian Lands 10 (1975).
73. The Secretary could designate officials to approve leases in his place. See 25 U.S.C. § 396e.
74. 25 U.S.C. § 177.
75. Id. § 81.
76. Id. § 477.
77. Such leases were limited to ten year terms under the IRA. See 25 U.S.C. § 477. Secretarial
approval of these leases was not required unless also required within the tribal charter or constitution.
1988]
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branch,'7 and only after congressional action adopted these policies as
law, 79 did tribal control of Indian mineral production become practical.
B. Adoption of the Mineral Development Contract
For smaller tribes, the federally dominated Indian mineral leasing
program provided safe and satisfactory results in mineral production.80
Tribes with a greater interest in mineral development, however, sought out
the control and flexibility needed to make sound mineral management
decisions. The manner in which the Self-determination Act revitalized the
tribal power to contract and the fact that negotiated leases were not
favored, led those larger tribes to mineral production agreements instead of
leases. In short time, the types of mineral production contracts in use
overseas were adopted for use by several tribes.8"
Generally, there are five types of contractual agreement that could be
useful in the production of Indian minerals: these are the joint venture, the
production sharing contract, the management contract, the service con-
tract and the limited partnership. There are two varieties of joint ventures.
One establishes a distinct corporation whose profits are distributed
proportionately according to share holdings. The second avoids the
creation of a distinct corporation profits.82 The production sharing contract
is similar to the joint venture except that the product itself is shared on a
percentage basis.83 Both the joint venture and the production sharing
contract place the producer at risk since the cost of production is not
recovered unless production occurs.
Service and management contracts hold the greatest potential benefit
for tribes involved in mineral production. Service contracts are agreements
where independent operators are contracted to drill and operate wells for a
fee. 4 In service contract situations the tribe retains ownership of the
production equipment and the mineral resource which allows maximum
78. President's Message to Congress on Indian Affairs, supra note 2.
79. Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act, supra note 3.
80. Ziontz, Indian Self-determination: New Patterns for Mineral Development, ROCKY MTN.
MIN. L. FOUND. INST. ON INDIAN LAND DEVELOPMENTIN OIL, GAS, COALAND OTHER MINERALS, 13-
15 (1976).
81. Id. at 13-16. Mr. Ziontz cautioned that two distinct differences between developing nations
and Indian tribes had to be reckoned with. First, mineral reserves in developing nations far exceeded the
known reserves on any reservation. Second, tribes were not generally interested in the rapid
industrialization that made such agreements effective overseas.
82. Lipton, The Pros and Cons of Petroleum Agreements, 6 AM. INDIAN JOURNAL 2 (February
1980).
83. Id. at 9.
84. Comment, Indian Tribes: Self-Determination Through the Effective Management of
Natural Resources, 17 TULSA L.J. 507, 524 n. 107 (1982).
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economic recovery from development. 5 Under management contract,
tribes contract with management companies to provide technical services
needed in planning, operating and evaluating mineral development opera-
tions.86 Such contract may be written to provide for tribal-member training
programs with a goal toward complete tribal control of mineral develop-
ment.8 7 Both the management contract and the service contract, however,
place the risk of production on the tribes-a risk that may not be
acceptable to most tribes.88
The limited partnership also holds potential for the development of
tribal minerals, Under this arrangement, the tribe contributes its mineral
resource and investors contribute the capital needed to begin mineral
production.8 9 Such an arrangement gives the tribe complete control of the
profits without the financial risk and is, therefore, favored by some. The
limited partnership arrangement, however, presupposes that the tribe is
capable of monitoring and managing the development projectY0
Several aspects of contract agreements between Indians and non-
Indians must be reviewed and understood. All contracts between Indians
and non-Indians affecting an interest in Indian lands must be approved by
the Secretary.91 A tribe's interest in its land cannot be transferred out of
tribal ownership without specific legislative authorization. 2 And, as
sovereigns, tribes are restricted from contractually limiting their sovereign
authority. 3 Ultimately, within these restraints, contracts between tribes,
qua tribes, and mineral producers will depend on three factors: the degree
of tribal control sought, the capital contribution required by the tribe, and
the tax consequences of such agreements."4
The first mineral development contract approved by the Secretary
under the Self-determination Act was the Blackfeet-Damson agreement.95
That agreement-a joint venture-provided Damson with certain tax
benefits and the tribe with a greater potential economic return through a
net-profit arrangement.96 The Blackfeet-Damson agreement represented
the beginning of tribal interest in developing mineral resources through
contract agreements. The Blackfeet-Damson agreement also became the
85. Id.
86. Ziontz, supra note 80, at 13-14.
87. Id.
88. Lipton, supra note 82, at 10.
89. See Comment, supra note 84.
90. Id.
91. 25 U.S.C. § 81.
92. Id. § 177.
93. Ziontz, supra note 80, at 13-34.
94. Isreal, supra note 68, at 10-32.
95. Ziontz, supra note 80, at 13-16.
96. Lipton, supra note 82, at 9.
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model for future development agreements.97 In approving this agreement,
the Secretary tacitly approved the use of the contract agreements in Indian
mineral development.
The Department gradually established regulations governing the use
of mineral development contracts and to provide the information necessary
for the negotiation of such contracts.9" In 1976, the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, Office of Trust Responsibility, established the Division of Energy
Minerals to provide tribes with the best information available on Indian
mineral resources.99 The Department also proposed regulations which
recognized "the authority of Indian mineral owners to negotiate with the
minerals industry to develop their natural resources, and to enter into any
lawful contractual arrangement which [furthered that goal] ... .,00 The
proposed regulations required detailed plans where the contract involved
both exploration and development,10 1 established the approval would only
occur where a fair and reasonable enumeration was provided to the mineral
owner, and required that the benefits under a contract outweighed any
adverse cultural or environmental consequences. " While these regula-
tions were not quickly adopted, it's likely that these factors were considered
when contracts for mineral development were submitted for approval.103
Even without approval of proposed regulations, some tribes negoti-
ated and entered into non-lease agreements for the production of their
mineral resources.104 Tribes also initiated service contracts to help assess
their potential for mineral production and for the establishment of tribal
97. The Blackfeet-Damson agreement specified the nature of the relationship, the financial
interest of the parties, management and control provisions, contractor obligations, production rights,
taxation, duration and termination, resolution of disputes, defined the tribal interest in production, and
reserved the tribe's right to contract with others.
98. See 42 Fed. Reg. 18083 (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 171 (proposed April 5, 1977)).
99. The Division of Energy and Minerals immediately embarked on a three-phased assessment
of tribal mineral resources. The first phase included a literary search and records review to determine
what is known of the mineral resource within Indian reservations. The second phase includes a review of
technical information and on-site inspections (regional exploration) to develop proprietary information
on the tribe's mineral resource potential. The third phase includes site specific studies and drilling with
the intent to develop a mining plan; these activities occur only at the request of the tribe. At present,
phase one of the mineral assessment is nearly complete and this information is available to tribal
mineral managers. Interview with Steve Manydeeds, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Division of Energy and
Minerals, Golden, Colorado (March 2, 1987).
100. 42 Fed. Reg. 18083 (April 5, 1977).
101. Id. at 18089 (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 177.5 (proposed April 5, 1977)).
102. Id. at 18086 and 18095 (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. §§ 171.5 and 182.13 (proposed April 5,
1977)).
103. By 1980 the majority of the proposed regulations still had not been adopted and the
Department was still soliciting comments on them. See 45 Fed. Reg. 24200 (April 9, 1980).
104. Indian Mineral Development: Hearings Before the Select Committee on Indian Affairs,
United States Senate, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 169, Appendix (1982).
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mineral offices.10 5 In the short time after the enactment of the Self-
determination Act, Indian mineral development had expanded far beyond
the restrictive system established under the 1938 Act.
Serious and disabling questions were soon raised about the validity of
such contracts. For example, while the mineral development contracts
were effected pursuant to Section 81, that section permitted only the
extraction of the mineral-not its sale. 06 Also, since Section 81 did not
apply to leases, the limitations imposed by the 1938 Act remained intact. 07
Finally, the Department declined to give the term "lease" a meaning broad
enough to include contractual transaction.' Although pressure increased
to approve non-lease agreements, faced with these issues, the Department
became reluctant to take further action without specific authorization. 09
This reluctance confirmed what some observers had already assumed,
corrective legislation was needed to resolve these problems.
Following a series of public hearings on the subject, Congress enacted
the Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982 (IMDA)."10 The objective of
the IMDA, broadly stated, was to further the goals of self-determination
policies and to maximize the financial return for valuable tribal mineral
resources."' The enactment specifically authorized any Indian tribe or
Indian to enter into mineral development agreements-subject to the
Secretary's approval." 2 The Act established an affirmative duty to approve
or to disapprove such contracts within a specified time,"3 provided for
review and approval of agreements previously engaged, 1 4 and protected
the United States from any liability arising from the employment of such
contracts."15 The IMDA also preserved the 1938 Act 1 6 and the provisions
105. Indian Economic Development Programs: Oversight Hearings Before the Committee on
the Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1979) (material
submitted during testimony of Edward Gabriel, Executive Director of CERT: "Technical Assistance
Projects Undertaken by CERT for Individual Tribes").
106. See Hearings, supra note 104, at 2 (comments of Senator Melcher).
107. Id. at 76-77. (prepared statement of Ken Smith, Asst. Sec. for Indian Affairs, Dept. of
Interior).
108. Id. at 72 (statement by Solicitor Vollman).
109. Id. at 77.
110. Indian Mineral Development Act of 1982, Pub.L.No.97-382,96Stat. 1938 (codifiedat25
U.S.C. §§ 2101 - 2119 (1982)).
111. See Hearings, supra note 104.
112. 25 U.S.C. § 2102. A mineral agreement is "any joint venture, operating, production
sharing, service, managerial, lease or other agreement, or any amendment, supplement, or other
modification of such agreement providing for the exploration for, extraction, processing or other
development of oil, gas, uranium, coal, geothermal, or other energy or nonenergy mineral re-
sources .. " Id.
113. Id. § 2103.
114. Id. § 2104.
115. Id. § 2103(e).
116. Id. § 2105.
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of the IRA related to land use by reorganized tribes.117 The IMDA assured
tribes of the flexibility desired for the effective and beneficial management
of tribal resources.
Regulations proposed to govern the negotiation of mineral develop-
ment agreements under the IMDA were initially published in 1983.118
Among many other things the proposals restated the authority to enter into
mineral agreements," 9 established a fourteen point review of negotiations
of such agreements,'120 adopted standards similar to those in contract
regulations for the approval of such agreements,'121 and protected Indian
interests by classifying departmental findings as propriety. 122 Tribes and
tribal organizations have communicated closely with the Department of
the Interior as these regulations were being developed. These regulations
were not finalized and adopted until early this year.
Meanwhile, non-lease mineral agreements have been and continue to
be presented to the Department for approval. Some agreements have been
rejected.123  Most, however, have been approved following minor
modifications.'24
C. Additional Acts Aiding the Indian Mineral Development
Program
Two other federal laws, enacted in 1982, will have an impact on the
manner in which tribes approach the development of their mineral
resources. The Indian Tax Status Act of 1982,125 affords tribes essentially
the same tax status enjoyed by the states. 2" Under this act, a tribal
117. Id. § 2108.
118. 48 Fed. Reg. 31979, 25 C.F.R. § 211 (proposed July 12, 1983). Interestingly, these
regulations do not reflect a competitive posture which was intended by Congress. Compare with S. REP.
No. 472, Permitting Indian Tribes to Enter into Certain Agreements for the Disposition of Tribal
Resources and Other Purposes, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982).
119. 48 Fed. Reg. 31979 (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 211.4 (proposed July 12, 1983)).
120. 48 Fed. Reg. 31980 (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 211.5 (proposed July 12, 1983)).
121. 48 Fed. Reg. 31980 (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. §211.6 (proposedJuly 12, 1983));compare
25 C.F.R. § 171.5 (proposed April 5, 1977).
122. 48 Fed. Reg. 31980 (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. § 211.6 (proposed July 12, 1983)).
123. Interview with Mervyn Tano, attorney, Consolidated Energy Resource Tribes, Denver,
Colorado (March 2, 1987).
124. Id.
125. Indian Governmental Tax Status Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2608 (1982)
(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 787 1). As enacted this Act had a duration of two years but the provision was
enacted permanently in 1984. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, Title X, § 1065,
98 Stat. 494, 1048.
126. This paper only skims the potential attraction for investors through the use of tax exempt
bonds. The Act also has far reaching benefits for the federal taxpayer. These benefits include possible
deductions for tribal taxes, for donations to tribal election campaigns, for charitable contributions and
gifts to tribal governments and for various business related assessments. See P.H. Taxes 41902
(January 8, 1987).
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government (or subdivision thereof) may issue tax-exempt bonds where
"substantially all of the proceeds... are to be used in the exercise of any
essential governmental function.' 7 Here, the phrase "substantially all" is
afforded its tradition meaning 12 and "essential governmental function" is
broadly defined by the regulations. 9
Of course, certain restrictions do apply. The act specifically prohibits
tax-exemptions for private activity bonds'30 and the general exceptions to
tax-exempt status within the code may also apply.' 3 ' Notwithstanding
these restrictions, careful planning may allow tribes to issue tax-exempt
bonds to fund tribal mineral offices or even to finance tribally owned
mineral projects.'3 2 Ultimately, the usefulness of bond financing will
depend on the respective tribe's mineral potential, a tribe's production
capabilities and the risk inherent in the bonded project. The potential for
raising capital through bond issues to fund mineral development projects
cannot be ignored.
The second enactment affecting the future of Indian mineral develop-
ment is the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act
(FOGRMA).' 33 Prior to this enactment, federal royalty accounting was in
disarray and suggestions of large scale thefts from federal oil and gas leases
were prominent.13 4 FOGRMA required the Department of the Interior to
establish a comprehensive royalty accounting program that included
maintenance of records,'13 5 prompt disbursement of royalties, 3 6 an expla-
nation for each disbursement,13 7 on-site inspections, 8 penalties for late
payments,"3 9 and civil and criminal penalties for violations related to
production and royalty accounting.'40 In 1985, more than two years after
its enactment, many of the provisions in FOGRMA had not been
127. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(c)(1).
128. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 305.7871-1(c) (1987).
129. Id. § 305.7871-1(d).
130. 26 U.S.C. § 7871(c)(2).
131. Id. § 103(b). This code section excepts from tax-exempt status arbitrage bonds and
requires such bonds be registered to gain tax-exempt status. Id. § 149.
132. Apparently, even a joint venture can be funded in this manner provided the venture is
principally owned by the tribe, and ninety percent of the proceeds of the bond issue are used in the
operations for that venture.
133. Federal Oil and Gas Royalty Management Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-451,96 Stat. 2447
(codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1701 - 1757 (1984)).
134. See generally General Accounting Office, Oil and Gas Royalty Collec-
tions-Longstanding Problems Costing Millions (October 29, 1981); LINOWES COMMISSION ON
FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE NATION'S ENERGY RESOURCES (1982).
135. 30 U.S.C. § 1713.
136. Id. § 1714.
137. Id. § 1715.
138. Id. § 1718.
139. Id. § 1721.
140. Id. §§ 1719 and 1720.
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implemented. 4'
The federal agency charged with the royalty management program is
the Minerals Management Service. Given the monumental task of
repairing the accounting program, it not surprising that the program is not
yet fully operational. 42 The Minerals Management Service has, however,
adopted an action plan which would eventually make the accounting
program assessable to all tribes. 43 Once assessable, the program will
undoubtedly undergo years of fine tuning. The fully operational system,
however, will provide valuable and much needed information to Indian
tribes and the individual Indian allottee.' 44 Such information will become a
valuable tool for the evaluation and projection of Indian mineral develop-
ment, permitting managers to make adjustments as accordingly.145
IV. STATE AND TRIBAL TAXATION OF MINERAL PRODUCTION
A. The Historical Right of Taxation
Early in our history the United States Supreme Court was called upon
to determine the status of tribes within our borders. The resulting decisions
in Johnson v. McIntosh,46 and the Cherokee cases 47 reduced the Indian
tribal status to that of a domestic dependent nation148 while preserving for
the tribes the sovereign right to govern its own people. A tribe, as a
conquered nation, was restricted from transferring rights in its lands or in
making treaties with foreign nations.' 49 The tribal sovereignty preserved
included the right to restrict occupancy of tribal territory. 50 The sover-
141. COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 13TH REPORT, INDIAN OIL AND GAS
ROYALTY PAYMENTS: PROBLEMS PERSIST, H.R. Doc. No. 214, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
142. The Minerals Management Service has primary responsibility for the royalty management
program but successfully meeting its task requires the cooperation of other federal agencies including
the BIA and the BLM.
143. See Mineral Management Service, Special Report: Management Action Plan for the
Royalty Management Program (1985).
144. Some question has been raised concerning the responsibility of the Service to account for
royalty production and disbursement in instances where non-lease mineral contracts are employed.
FOGRMA, however, included a statement regarding the enduring trust responsibility and, the
Service's own action management plan recites benefits for all Indian producers. Unless the producer
has contracted to conduct royalty accounting the responsibility for the task will remain with the
Service.
145. "In order for any leasing program to operate with maximum efficiency, a basic assumption
must be that accurate information be kept on the past performance of the program. Only by examining
and analyzing past performance can future performance be more effective. See FTC Report,
supra note 6.
146. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
147. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6
Pet.) 515 (1832).
148. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
149. Id. at 7-18.
150. Worchester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561; See also COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN
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eignty retained cannot be diminished except by federal statute or treaty, or
by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.15' Chief
among the sovereign powers retained was the power of taxation.
The tribal right to levy taxes has historically been recognized.
Administratively, at least, the earliest recognition of the tribal power of
taxation is present in opinions of the United States Attorney General. 152
Several federal cases also recognized the tribal right of taxation.15 3 In
1934, tribal powers were reviewed by the Department of the Interior. The
decision which followed that review recognized that taxation was one of the
chief powers of sovereignty retained by Indian tribes.5 That power "may
be exercised over members of the tribe and over nonmembers, so far as such
nonmembers may accept privileges of trade, residence, etc., to which taxes
may be attached as conditions."' 155 The opinion recognized that the right
"might be curtailed by express language of a treaty or statute, but
otherwise remained intact."' 56 Written in response to congressional
inquiries, the opinion has further significance in that it identifies taxation
as a power preserved for the tribes under Section 16 of the IRA. 57
B. Tribal Taxation of Mineral Production
While tribes held that right, it was not until the late 1960's that tribes
instituted taxes which affected on-reservation mineral production. 58 In
1968, the Jicarilla Apache tribe effected a constitutional revision permit-
ting the tribal council to impose fees and taxes against members and
nonmembers doing business on the reservation. 59 The imposition of taxes
against nonmembers required the Secretary's approval. 60 Soon thereaf-
ter, the tribal council enacted an oil and gas severance tax and that the tax
LAw 252 (ed. 1982).
151. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978).
152. See Choctaw and Chickasaws Permit Laws, 18 Op. Att'y Gen. 34 (1884) (supporting the
tribal permit law for occupation within the reservation); Cherokee Indians-Export Tax on Hay, 23
Op. Att'y Gen. 528 (1901) (recognizing the tribe's right to levy an export tax on hay).
153. See Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Maxey v. Wright, 3 Indian Terr. 243, 54
S.W. 807 (1900).
154. Powers of Indian Tribes, 55 I.D. 14, 46-8 (1934).
155. Id. at 46.
156. Id. at 48.
157. Id. at 17. See also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 544 (10th Cir. 1980).
158. The fact that tribes did not actively pursue their right to tax for several years could be
attributed to many factors-no single factor being determinative. At least one commentator has noted
that many tribes pursued taxation in hopes of defeating state taxes. Isreal, supra note 68, at 10-37. And
tribes often had good reason to react in this manner. Often the majority of the mineral income was lost
to the states through taxation. See Crow Tribe v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1105, 1107 (9th Cir. 1981).
159. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 135.
160. Id.
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obtained approval of the Secretary in 1976.11 The mineral producers with
current leases on the reservation sued to prevent the assessment of those
taxes. 62 The resulting litigation was determined by the United States
Supreme Court and the Court's decision marked a turning point in the area
of tribal taxation. s
The Court's decision in Merrion noted several points in support of a
tribe's authority to tax nonmembers doing business on a reservation. The
Court recognized that the tribe's responsibility to provide protection and
other governmental services supported the taxation of nonmembers bene-
fiting from those services. 64 The Court firmly stated that the right arose
from the tribe's standing as sovereign and not solely from the tribe's right to
exclude.16 5 Even if the right to tax was solely related to the tribal right to
exclude, the Court would have upheld the tax."6
In Merrion the petitioner's presented a second argument that the right
of taxation had been preempted by legislation and federal policy.A7 The
Court, however, stated that such a preemption must be express.168 In the
absence of finding an express preemption, 69 the Court rejected the
contention that the taxes were invalid.170 The petitioner's argument that
the taxes were invalidated because of the negative implications of the
Commerce clause was also rejected.17'
The Jicarilla Apache tribe had reorganized under the IRA17 2 and,
since the revised constitution, required the Secretary's approval of certain
taxes, that approval was obtained. A cursory reading of the Merrion
decision suggests that the Court would require approval of any tribal taxes
affecting nonmembers within a reservation. 73 Whether a tribe which did
not reorganize under the IRA could impose taxes, and whether the
Secretary's approval would be required before levying such taxes, re-
161. Id. at 135-36.
162. Id. at 136.
163. See Merrion, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
164. Id. at 139-40.
165. Id. at 144.
166. Id. at 144-48.
167. Id. at 149.
168. Id. at 150-52.
169. Id. at 149. The Court has recognized the need for express language in Congressional
preemption of tribal sovereignty. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 60 (1978). In any
event, the Court has consistently resolved ambiguities in favor of the Indians. See McClanahan v.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
170. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152.
171. Id. at 152-59.
172. Following the enactment of the IRA, 181 tribes accepted its provisions and reorganized; 77
tribes rejected it. See Comment, Tribal Self-government and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,
70 MICH. L. REV. 955 (1972).
173. Merrion, 445 U.S. at 141, 155.
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mained an open question.
In 1978, the Navajo tribal council enacted two ordinances imposing
taxes that would affect mineral lessees within its reservation.174 The
Navajo tribe, unlike the Jicarilla tribe, did not reorganize under the IRA.
Neither did its constitution require the Secretary's approval of tribal
taxes. 7 5 In fact, when the tribe sought approval of its taxes, the tribe was
informed that "no federal statute or regulation required the Department of
the Interior to approve or to disapprove the taxes.' 1 6 Before the tribe could
implement its tax ordinances, however, the taxes were challenged and a
federal district court permanently enjoined the enforcement of the tax
ordinances. 77
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
that decision, 7 8 and the United States Supreme Court affirmed that
opinion. 79 In Kerr McGee, the court again recognized a tribe's sovereign
right of taxation. The Court declared that the "we do not believe that
[IRA] reveal [s] Congress limited the Navajo Tribal Council's authority to
tax non-indians." 8 0 The Court examined provisions of the 1938 Act and
found that nothing in the act required the Secretary to approve the tribal
taxes."8' The federal government's firm commitment to the goal of tribal
self-government was recognized as adding credence to the Navajo's
assertion of the power to tax. 82 The Court restated that the "power to tax
• ..nonmembers. . .[was] an essential attribute of self-government,"
and that "neither Congress nor the Navajo's have found it necessary to
subject the Tribal Council's tax laws to review by the Secretary of the
Interior ... ."183
The Court's decisions in Merrion and Kerr McGee held to traditional
views and reaffirmed that tribes, as sovereigns, possessed the right to tax
nonmembers within its borders. As Merrion indicates, the only administra-
tive hurdles to be cleared before imposing a tax are present as a result of
tribal action.'84 Certainly, the tribal right of taxation may be preempted by
federal action but no such preemption exists. 85 Given the important role of
174. Kerr McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 471 U.S. 195-97 (1985).
175. Id. at 198-99.
176. Id. at 197.
177. Id.
178. Kerr McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe, 731 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1984).
179. Kerr McGee, 471 U.S. 195 (1985).
180. Id. at 200.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 201.
183. Id.
184. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 133-36.
185. Id. at 149 (citing Washington v. ConfederateTribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. 134, 152 (1980).
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tribal taxation in current federal policy, it is unlikely that any federal
preemption will soon arise.186
Today many tribes levy taxes against nonmembers that impact
mineral production within their reservations. Such taxes may be placed
into one of four general classes: commencement taxes, property taxes,
production taxes and environmental protection taxes. 8 Commencement
taxes are imposed by some tribes and these taxes require the payment of a
tax before a mining operation may begin. 188 Property taxes are often
assessed against real or personal property held by a business on tribal
lands. 89 Production taxes, such a as severance taxes, have been imposed by
several tribes. 90 Environmental protection taxes, which are imposed to
help fund projects to correct environmental damage caused by mining,
have also been enacted by some tribes.' 9'
The increased interest among tribes in taxing mineral production 92
has created some discussion concerning the limitations of tribal taxing
authority. In Merrion, the petitioner's argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that
the tribe's tax violated the "negative implications" of the Commerce
Clause. 93 Some commentators have read that decision to suggest that
tribal taxes must pass the tests established under that clause.,'9 The Court
itself, however, has recognized that such an examination has conceptual
difficulties. 95 It simply does not follow that tribes should be subject to the
same taxing restraints as states under this clause.
The tribal right of taxation, it must be remembered, is a sovereign
right which predates the United States Constitution and is not subject to its
restraints.9 6 The Indian Commerce Clause, which extends to Congress
plenary authority over Indian affairs, has traditionally been interpreted as
186. From time to time, bills are introduced which would affect the Indian power to tax, but such
bills are not adopted. See, e.g., 133 Cong. Rec. E1600 (daily ed. April 28, 1987).
187. Neumann, Taxation of Natural Resource Production on Tribal Lands, 1985 TAXES 813,
816 (Nov. 1985).
188. Id. at 816 n. 25.
189. Id. at 816 n. 26. In Kerr McGee, the possessory tax at issue was a form of property tax.
190. See, e.g., FORT PECK COMPREHENSIVE CODE OF JUsTICE, § 201 (1983); Blackfeet Tribe
Council Resolution 1076 (Oct. 18, 1976). The business activities tax in Kerr McGee and the severance
tax in Merrion are business activities taxes. See Neumann, supra note 187, at 817-18.
191. See, e.g., APACHE TRiB. CODE, tit. 24, § 2 (1982).
192. The idea that tribes began to impose taxes after realizing the economic benefit of them has
some merit. At least one report noted that as much as forty percent of a government's revenue from
mineral production may be realized from taxation. Taxation is a more direct source of revenue. See
Ziontz, supra note 80, at 13-33.
193. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152-58.
194. See Neumann, supra note 187. See also Fulwood, Of Tribes and Taxes: Limits on Indian
Tribal Power to Tax Nonmembers, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 729 (1986).
195. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 153.
196. Id. at 159.
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protective of Indian rights-not restrictive of them.197 Tribal taxes must
have some relationship to the sovereign responsibilities. 98 But nothing
suggests that tribal taxes must withstand the full breadth of the Complete
Auto test. 99 Whether this issue will ever arise before the Court is
unlikely.200 If the court faces the issue, however, the tribal right to
exclude,201 and its sovereign power-subject only to the restraints imposed
by Congress 202-must have some impact on any decision concerning the
issue.
C. State Taxation of Indian Mineral Production
During the past quarter century, the court has also reviewed the
extent of state jurisdiction to tax Indian interests. Early Court decisions
drew a rigid, line around the reservations and would not permit state
taxation of on-reservation Indian interests.203 By 1960, however, this rigid
delineation of state jurisdiction had started to waiver. Instead, the Court
sought to determine whether the state action was adversely affecting tribal
sovereignty.204 The policies and tests used to determine the extent of state
jurisdiction over Indian interests has been refined over the past fifteen
years.
The single case determining a state's authority to tax on-reservation
Indian mineral development, without express congressional authoriza-
tion,20 5 was decided in 1985. In Montana v. Blackfoot Tribe, the court held
that the state did not have jurisdiction to impose its taxes against mineral
leases executed under the 1938 Act.206 The Court noted that "Congress
can authorize the imposition of state taxes on Indian tribes and individual
197. Id. at 153-154.
198. See, e.g., 55 I.D. 14, 46 (1934).
199. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
200. Tribes are likely to avoid such challenges by enacting ordinances that will withstand such
scrutiny.
201. Because of its right to exclude, a non-Indian apparently conducts business on a reservation
at the pleasure of the tribe. It follows, therefore, that a tribe may adopt taxes without regard to the
impact on interstate commerce. See 55 I.D. 14, 48 (1934).
202. See supra text accompanying note 151.
203. See, e.g., The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867); The New York Indians, 72
U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867).
204. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). The Williams Test, as it became known, sought to
determine whether the state activity infringed on the tribal right to govern itself. The Court later
refused to apply this standard in a case where the state sought to tax an Indian-as opposed to a non-
Indian. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. at 179.
205. Where specific authorization has been given to tax, a state's right to tax on-reservation
mineral production is clear. See British Am. Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization of Montana,
299 U.S. 159 (1936).
206. Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
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Indians. .,,"207 and has done so on occasion.2 8 The 1938 Act, however,
did not expressly authorize the imposition of state taxes against Indian
mineral leases. In analyzing the taxes, the Court rejected the state's
argument that the earlier authorization inhered to the 1938 Act. 20 9 The
decision expounded the requirement of congressional authorization for
states to tax on-reservation tribal interests. States had authority to tax
leases under the 1924 and 1927 Acts,21 0 but that authority was not
extended in the 1938 Act.211
Tax questions, unrelated to mineral development, were decided by the
Court in the 1970's. In McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,
the Court answered the narrow question whether the state may tax an
Indian's income which was earned exclusively on the reservation. 12 The
doctrine of Indian sovereignty, the Court stated, would provide "a
backdrop against which applicable treaties and statues must be read.1 21 1
The Court then determined that the "appellant's rights as a reservation
Indian were violated when the state collected a tax from her which it had no
jurisdiction to impose."214 After McClanahan, states were barred from
imposing taxes against Indians-their income or properties-for activities
within an Indian reservation.
Another decision, Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones,21 5 resolved
whether a state could properly tax Indian interests and activities located
outside a reservation. Here, the Court noted at the outset that there was no
satisfactory authority permitting states to tax on-reservation Indian
activities.21 6 The Court recognized, however, that "Indians going beyond
reservation boundaries have generally been held subject to nondiscrimina-
tory state law. .. ,,2117 In Mescalero, the tribe held federal leases off-
reservation and operated a ski resort on those lands. The Court rejected the
tribes broad arguments of exemption 218 but recognized that the state's tax
207. Id. at 765.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 33 through 36.
209. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. at 766.
210. Id. at 767-68.
211. The Supreme Court's decision affirmed the Ninth Circuit opinion which left the question
that the incidence of the tax falls on the producer and not the tribe undecided. The State of Montana
has not yet conceded this issue. At stake is the state's right to tax over 170 mineral leases on the
Blackfeet reservation executed under the 1938 Act. Only 8 leases are in effect that can be taxed under
earlier acts.
212. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 168.
213. Id. at 172.
214. Id. at 181.
215. 411 U.S. 145 (1973).
216. Id. at 148.
217. Id. at 148-49.
218. Id. at 147-55.
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authority was restricted under the IRA.219 The Court did not permit the
state's taxes to effect the tribal property interests but allowed that the state
could tax the tribal income.2
Since the end of the Termination Era, the Court has struggled with
the conflict between state and tribal taxation. The exterior boundaries of a
reservation are no longer barriers to state jurisdiction. Clearly, on-
reservation Indian activities can not be taxed by the states. Indian interests
off-reservation, in the absence of preemptive legislation, will be subject to
state taxes. But not all tax or jurisdiction issues can be classified as on or off
reservation and Indian or non-Indian. Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court have developed a balanced approach to determining such
issues.
In White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,21 the Court reviewed
the state's authority to levy taxes against on-reservation, non-Indian
activities. The Court's decision recognized two key concepts in the area of
state and tribal tax authority. First, that a state's authority will not be
permitted to "infringe 'on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them.' "222 Second, that a state's regulatory
authority over tribal reservations and tribal members may be preempted
by federal law.223 The Court went on to state that "these two barriers are
independent of each other, and either, standing alone, can be a sufficient
basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the
reservation by tribal members."2 2'
In White Mountain, a company organized and operated by the tribe
had subcontracted some of its timber harvesting responsibilities to a non-
Indian operator engaged in activities within the reservation. 225 The Court
recognized that when on-reservation Indian interests are involved, the
federal interest in encouraging tribal self-government will likely preempt
state tax authority.2 6 But where non-Indians engage in on-reservation
activities, the situation called "for a particularized inquiry into the nature
of state, federal, and tribal interests a stake, an inquiry designed to
determine whether, in specific context, the exercise of state authority
would violate federal law."2 27 Here, the Court noted the extensive federal
219. Id. at 155-59.The Mescalero Apache Tribe had reorganized under the IRA and, therefore,
the provisions of that act applied to the tribe's activities.
220. Id. at 157-59.
221. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
222. Id. at 142 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
223. Id. at 142.
224. Id. at 143. The two barriers are independent yet related since tribal self-government is
ultimately dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress.
225. Id. at 139-40.
226. Id. at 144.
227. Id. at 145.
1988]
PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW
regulation governing timber harvesting, and its underlying policies, far
exceeded the state's interest in raising revenue. 228 Federal law and
regulation preempted the state's authority to impose its taxes on the non-
Indian operator.
The concept that federal law can preempt a state's taxation of non-
Indian, on-reservation activities was restated in Central Machinery Co. v.
Arizona Tax Commission.2 29 In Central Machinery, the Court allowed
that the federal laws governing trade with the Indians preempted state laws
imposing an additional burden on Indian traders. 230 The fact that the
trader was not licensed and did not reside on the reservation held little
significance. The important factor was the existence of federal law
affecting trade with Indians on the reservation that preempted state
action.231
Both White Mountain and Central Machinery rested on the preemp-
tion principle.23 2 Often left unconsidered is the infringement doctrine.
Even if a state's authority is not preempted by federal law, a state cannot
infringe upon a tribe's interest in self-government.
In Crow Tribe v. Montana,33 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed a lower court decision and held that a state's mineral
production taxes were preempted under federal law23 4 and an infringement
on the tribe's right of self-government.235 The court noted that "the
principle of tribal self-government [seeks] 'an accommodation between the
interests of the Tribes and the Federal Government on the one hand, and
those of the state, on the other.' ",286 Under this principle "a state tax is not
invalid merely because it deprives the Tribe of revenues used to sustain
itself and its programs. "237 Under the infringement test, however, state
taxes must have a legitimate purpose and be narrowly tailored to serve that
purpose.23 8 Montana's taxes were not narrowly tailored and the court
found the taxes to be an impermissible erosion of tribal sovereignty. 2 9
228. Id. at 151-52.
229. Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980).
230. Id. at 163-64.
231. Id. at 165-66.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 223 and 230.
233. Crow Tribe v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), affd, 108 S.Ct. 790 (1988).
234. Id. at 897-902. Here the court recognized that the state's taxes were incompatible with
federal and tribal interests, and that the state's interests were not clearly linked to the tax imposed.
Thus, the state's taxes were preempted by federal law and policy.
235. Id. at 902-03.
236. Id. at 902 (citing Colville, 447 U.S. at 156).
237. Id.; See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 1980), as
amended, 655 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1982).
238. Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d at 902.
239. Id. at 903.
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States may always exercise the authority to tax Indian interests where
there is express legislative authorization. However, such authorization is
rare and state taxes must, therefore, survive the tests established in
common law.2 40 The principles found in the cases cited create some
interesting possibilities for Indian mineral production.
Generally, off-reservation development of Indian owned minerals will
be taxable. 4 State taxes cannot reach the tribal production of on-
reservation mineral resources. Contracts with non-Indian producers to
develop such minerals are also likely to avoid state taxes. 42 An Indian
tribe, acting as a mineral producer under the IMDA is likely to avoid state
taxation even when moving off-reservation to develop Indian owned
minerals.2 43 Finally, if a tribe adopts comprehensive mining codes or
accepts control of on-reservation mineral development, a strong argument
may be made for tribal taxation of non-Indian mineral development on fee
lands within a reservation. 4' The potential value of mineral taxation
causes the tax consequences to be a major factor in adopting tribal mineral
development programs.
V. CONCLUSION
The Indian mineral leasing program established under the 1938 Act,
although surviving as law, is no longer the single option available to mineral
producing tribes. Legislative changes during the past decade have relaxed
the rigid mineral leasing framework. The flexibility now incorporated into
the Indian mineral development program answers the critics and reflects
federal self-determination policies.
The IMDA, which allows tribes to execute non-lease mineral develop-
ment contracts is a significant improvement in Indian minerals develop-
ment. Tribes with a great mineral resource are likely to pursue contractual
production agreements far more beneficial to the tribe than lease agree-
ments. Federal plans for royalty accounting and increased accessibility to
royalty and production information may help tribes make responsible
choices in mineral development. Also, the treatment of tribes on a level
parallel with the states for federal tax purposes can assist tribes to obtain
240. Crow Tribe, 650 F.2d at 1110.
241. See Crow Tribe v. Montana, 657 F. Supp. 573 (D. Mont. 1985).
242. On-reservation tribal interests simply will not be taxable without express authorization.
See McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). On-reservation non-Indian producers will likely be protected
because of the intense federal control over tribal mineral development. Cf. White Mountain Apache
Tribe, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
243. This is because of federal exemptions and federal policies behind the IMDA and general
interests in self-determination that would likely outweigh any legitimate state interest.
244. In such a situation, any state interest may be deemed insignificant given the federal interest
in self-determination in combination with the tribe's interest as producer, owner and income manager.
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programs which enhance their mineral production capabilities.
For decades, Indian tribes have withstood the often crippling effect of
state taxation of mineral production. Recent Court decisions, however,
have reduced that disability to a mere possibility. In fact, careful planning
of tribal mineral development can eliminate most state taxation. Further,
the assertion of the tribal right to tax can bring additional revenues for
tribal governments. Properly employed, the right of taxation may also be a
valuable regulatory tool.
The development of tribal minerals under non-lease mineral agree-
ments is not a viable option for all tribes. For that matter, neither can
mineral production become the foundation for tribal self-determination.
But legislation and court decisions have resulted in flexibility and yielded
greater potential for Indian mineral development. For the Indian mineral
development program, more than any other federal Indian program, self-
determination has arrived.
